Trade, the Damage from Alien Species, and the Effects of Protectionism Under Alternate Market Structures by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Hamid Beladi
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO, COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
Working Paper SERIES 
     
Wp# 0043ECO-414-2008 
 
April 3, 2008 
 
Trade, the Damage from Alien Species, and the Effects of Protectionism Under 








   
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, 






Department of Economics, University of Texas at San Antonio,  




Department of Economics, 
University of Texas at San Antonio, 
San Antonio, TX 78249, U.S.A 
Copyright ©2006 by the UTSA College of Business. All rights reserved.  This document can be downloaded 
without charge for educational purposes from the UTSA College of Business Working Paper Series 
(business.utsa.edu/wp) without explicit permission, provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to 
the source.  The views expressed are those of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect official 
positions of UTSA, the College of Business, or any individual department. 
ONE UTSA CIRCLE    
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS  78249-0631        
210 458-4317  |  BUSINESS.UTSA.EDU 1
We thank the Editor J. Barkley Rosser and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.
In addition, we thank participants at (i) the 2005 Midwest Economic Theory and International Economics meeting in Lawrence,
Kansas, (ii) an IEFS session in the 2006 ASSA meeting in Boston, (iii) the 2006 WRSA meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico, (iv) the
2006 NARSC meeting in Toronto and (v) the economics department in SUNY Binghamton, for their comments. Finally, Batabyal
acknowledges financial support from USDA’s PREISM program by means of Cooperative Agreement 43-3AEM-4-80100 and from
the Gosnell endowment at RIT. The usual disclaimer applies.
2
Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, 92 Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, NY 14623-5604, USA. Internet
aabgsh@rit.edu
3
Department of Economics, University of Texas at San Antonio, 1600 N. Loop 1604 West, San Antonio, TX 78249-0631, USA.
Internet hamid.beladi@utsa.edu
1
Trade, the Damage from Alien Species, and the Effects of








Trade, the Damage from Alien Species, and the Effects of
Protectionism Under Alternate Market Structures
Abstract
We first construct three measures of the expected damage from the unintentional introduction
of alien species into a country called Home. We then focus on four market structures. First, perfect
competition prevails in both Home and Foreign and Home is a small country. Second, the Home and
the Foreign markets are both perfectly competitive but Home is now a large country. Third, the
exporter in Foreign is a monopolist and there are no import competing firms in Home. Finally, the
Foreign exporter and the import competing firm in Home engage in Cournot competition. In all four
scenarios, we analyze the impact of small and optimal Home tariffs on prices, exports, imports, the
damage from alien species, and social welfare, in Home. Inter alia, our analysis identifies conditions
under which it makes sense to use trade policy (tariffs) to regulate invasive species and conditions
under which it does not. 
Keywords: Alien Species, International Trade, Market Structure, Social Welfare, Tariff
JEL Codes: Q560, F130, F1803
1. Introduction
The fact that alien species (also known as invasive or non-native species) have been and
continue to be introduced into one part of the world from another is not new. What is new is the
realization that such introductions, particularly the unintentional ones, have often been very costly
for the concerned nations. In this regard, consider the case of the United States. A report by the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA (1993)) declared that the annual monetary damage resulting
from biological invasions is between $4.7 and $6.5 billion. More recent research by Pimentel et al.
(2000) has concluded that the total annual monetary damage from invasive species is in fact over
$100 billion. 
Researchers now recognize that maritime trade in goods comprises a sizeable proportion of
the world’s total international trade in goods. Ships are the primary vehicle in maritime trade and
consequently they are routinely used to carry goods of all kinds—often in containers—from one
country to another. Now, international trade theorists have demonstrated that there are benefits to
the nations involved in such voluntary trade. This notwithstanding, in recent times, natural resource
and environmental economists have contended that these gains are likely to be smaller than what
most researchers have believed thus far. Why? As Perrings et al. (2000), Costello and McAusland
(2003), Batabyal (2004), Batabyal et al. (2005), and Margolis et al. (2005) have noted, this is
because in addition to carrying goods between nations, ships have also managed to carry an
assortment of deleterious non-native plant and animal species from one part of the world to another.
As far as unintentional introductions—the primary focus of this paper—are concerned, there
are two main ways in which alien species have been carried from one part of the world to another.
First, many invasive species have been introduced into a country, often inadvertently, by ships4
discarding their ballast water. Cargo ships usually carry ballast water in order to increase vessel
stability when they are not carrying full loads. When these ships come into a seaport, this ballast
water must be jettisoned before cargo can be loaded. This manner of species introductions is
important and the problem of managing alien species that have been introduced into a particular
nation by means of the discharge of ballast water has now received some attention in the economics
literature (see Nunes and Van den Bergh (2004), and Yang and Perakis (2004), and Batabyal and
Beladi (2006)).
The second way in which alien species have been introduced into a particular country is by
means of contaminated goods—agricultural goods readily come to mind—that may or may not be
carried in containers. In this regard, the reader should note that invasive species can remain
concealed in containers for long periods of time. In addition, material such as wood—that is often
used to pack the cargo in the containers—may itself contain alien species. In fact, as pointed out by
Costello and McAusland (2003), a joint report from the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the United States Forest
Service (USFS) has noted that nearly 51.8% of maritime shipments contain solid wood packing
materials and that infection rates for solid wood packing materials are substantial (USDA, APHIS,
and USFS (2000, p. 25)). For example, inspections of wooden spools from China revealed infection
rates between 22% and 24% and inspections of braces for granite blocks imported into Canada were
found to hold live insects 32% of the time (USDA, APHIS, and USFS (2000, pp. 27-28)). 
Economists and ecologists are both very interested in managing invasive species. This is
because—see the first paragraph of this section—biological invasions can and often have proven
to be very costly from an economic standpoint. In addition to these economic costs, the work of5
Vitousek et al. (1996), Simberloff et al. (1997), Costello and McAusland (2003), and others reminds
us that alien species can alter ecosystem processes, act as vectors of diseases, and diminish
biological diversity. In this regard, Cox (1993) has observed that out of 256 vertebrate extinctions
with a known cause, 109 are the outcome of biological invasions. This discussion tells us that non-
native species have been and continue to be a great menace to society. 
It is only very recently that economists have begun to analyze questions pertaining to
invasive species management. For instance, Eiswerth and Johnson (2002) have studied an
intertemporal model of alien species stock management. They note that the optimal level of
management effort is responsive to ecological factors that are not only species and site specific but
also stochastic in nature. Second, Olson and Roy (2002) have used a stochastic framework to
examine the circumstances under which it is optimal to wipe out an invasive species and the
circumstances under which it is not optimal to do so. Third, Horan et al. (2002) have analyzed the
properties of management approaches under full information and under uncertainty. Fourth,
Batabyal et al. (2005) have observed that there is a tension between economic cost minimization and
inspection stringency in invasive species management. Finally, Batabyal and Beladi (2006) have
analyzed maximization problems stemming from the steady state analysis of two multi-person
inspection regimes. 
Despite the known connection between goods trade between countries and the damage from
alien species, with the exception of Jenkins (1996), ecologists in general have paid scant attention
to the role of trade policy in mitigating the damage from alien species introductions. Jenkins (1996)
has contended that it may be necessary to use trade policy (bans and restrictions) to protect
biological diversity. Very recently, a small number of papers have begun to analyze issues at the6
interface of international trade and invasive species management. Barbier and Shogren (2004) have
analyzed a growth model in which a biological invasion occurs as a spillover effect from the
importation of capital goods. They show that when a biological invasion diminishes the productivity
of all firms in the economy, the government ought to impose an output tax to equate the private and
the social desires for consumption growth and capital accumulation. Costello and McAusland (2003)
and McAusland and Costello (2004) have studied the impact that tariffs have on the damage from
invasive species introductions. Costello and McAusland (2003) show that a tariff can either decrease
or increase the damage from invasive species. McAusland and Costello (2004) show that although
it is always optimal to use tariffs to control the damage from alien species, the same cannot be said
about inspections. In particular, in their model, there are several circumstances in which it is optimal
to not inspect imported goods at all. Prestemon et al. (2006) study international trade in forest
products and show that trade liberalization will have a negligible effect on US imports of Siberian
logs and on the risk of a biological invasion. Finally, using an integrated model with an international
trade component, Zhao et al. (2006) demonstrate the consumer and the producer responses to
livestock disease outbreaks and the welfare effects of alternate invasive species management
policies.
Although the papers cited in the previous paragraph have certainly advanced our
understanding of the impacts of trade policy on the damage from invasive species, three outstanding
questions concerning the desirability of using trade policy to manage invasive species remain.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to analyze these three questions in detail. First, unlike the
extant literature, we use a two country model to study the efficacy of tariffs—as an invasive species4
For analyses of tariffs in other contexts, see Parai (1999), Biswas and Marjit (2007), and Vishwasrao et al. (2007).
5
We are not suggesting that this paper is the first to study the impacts of tariffs on social welfare when social welfare depends in part
on the damage from alien species. This issue has also been looked at by McAusland and Costello (2004) and by Margolis et al.
(2005). Instead, what we are suggesting is that, to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to collectively study the three
questions stated earlier in this paragraph. 
7
management tool—under four different market structures.
4 Second, we focus not just on small tariffs
but on small and on optimal tariffs. Finally, our emphasis is less on the impact that tariffs have on
the damage from invasive species per se and more on the impacts of tariffs on social welfare when
social welfare depends in part on the damage from alien species.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 briefly describes our two country
model. Sections 2.2 to 2.4 construct three measures of the expected damage in Home from the
introduction of alien species. Section 3.1 continues the description of our two country model. Then,
this section derives a general expression for the change in Home social welfare as a function of a
change in the Home tariff. Section 3.2 analyzes the impact of small and optimal tariffs imposed by
Home on the damage from invasive species, on prices, on exports and imports, and on social welfare
in Home for the case in which perfect competition prevails in both Home and Foreign and Home is
a small country. Section 3.3 does the same for the case in which the Home and the Foreign markets
are both perfectly competitive but Home is now a large country. Section 3.4 conducts a similar
analysis for the case in which the exporter in Foreign is a monopolist and there are no import
competing firms in Home. Section 3.5 also conducts the same kind of analysis as the previous three
sections but now the Foreign exporter and the import competing firm in Home engage in Cournot
competition. Section 3.6 first discusses the form of the dependence of all the tariff expressions on
the expected total damage from alien species introductions in Home. Next, this section comments8
briefly on scenarios in which the above discussed form of dependence would be different. Section
4 concludes and offers suggestions for future research on the subject of this paper.
2. Three Measures of Damage in Home from Stochastic Alien Species Introductions
2.1. Preliminaries
The world consists of two countries called Home and Foreign. Foreign exports and Home
imports a specific good that could be either an agricultural good or a manufactured good. Over time,
the import of this good also results in the probabilistic introduction of alien species from Foreign into
Home. Initially, because of scientific uncertainty, citizens and the relevant authorities in Home do
not realize that these unintentionally introduced alien species cause agricultural and/or ecological
damage in Home. However, with the passage of time, scientific evidence implicating the alien species
emerges and then it becomes clear to the citizens and to the aforementioned authorities that the
stochastic introductions of these alien species and the resulting monetary damage are linked to the
import of the good in question from Foreign. With this realization come calls for the use of trade
policies to restrict imports and thereby reduce the introduction of the deleterious alien species. 
Given this temporal sequence of events, we now construct three measures of the expected
damage in Home from the stochastic introduction of alien species. The measures in sections 2.2 and
2.3 are monetary measures of damage and the measure in section 2.4 is a physical measure of
damage. The damage measures in sections 2.2 and 2.4 are based on the work of Batabyal and
Nijkamp (2007) and the damage measure in section 2.3 is based on the analysis in Batabyal and
Beladi (2001). Why are we focusing on three measures of damage? This is because we would like
to ascertain whether alternate specifications of the damage metric have a similar or a dissimilar
qualitative impact on the various small and optimal tariff expressions that we derive in sections 3.26
See Kulkarni (1995, pp. 579-584) and Tijms (2003, pp. 449-455) for textbook accounts of the generating function.
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to 3.5 below.
2.2. First Measure of Damage
We model the stochastic nexus between the arrival of a possibly injurious alien species and
the attendant monetary damage that results if this species is able to establish itself in the new habitat
of Home. In this regard, we shall say that the monetary damages associated with the possibly
successful introduction of alien species “arrive” at Home in accordance with a Poisson process with
rate   and   In other words, the arrival rate of the monetary damages stemming from the
stochastic introduction of alien species is a function of the volume of imports   Further, we suppose
that as the volume of imports goes up, the arrival rate of the monetary damages also goes up.
Therefore, we have   The amounts of the successive monetary damages are independent
random variables that are assumed to have the common discrete distribution 
where   and the parameter   Our task now is to ascertain the distribution of the total
monetary damage in an interval   and, without loss of generality, we suppose that this interval
is a calender year.
Let us now compute the generating function of the discrete probability distribution specified
in the previous paragraph.
6 Because the common discrete distribution 
 has the natural logarithm function in it, to make further progress, we want to work with
a series expansion of the natural logarithm function. This series expansion is given by 10
(1)
Further, Theorem 1.2.1 in Tijms (2003, p. 19) tells us that the generating function of the total
monetary damage in a year can be written in terms of the exponential   Now, using this result from
Theorem 1.2.1, the series expansion in equation (1), and some thought, we are able to conclude that
the generating function of the total monetary damage in a year is given by
(2)
After several algebraic steps, the generating function in equation (2) can be written as
(3)
Consulting Kulkarni (1995, p. 584) it is clear that the generating function in equation (3) is the
generating function of a random variable that has a negative binomial distribution with parameters 
and   Therefore, we reason that the total monetary damage from biological invasions in a
calender year has a negative binomial distribution with the above specified parameters.
Using standard formulae for the negative binomial distribution, we can tell that the expected
total monetary damage from biological invasions in a calender year or   is
 (4)
Equation (4) gives us our first measure of the damage from stochastic alien species introductions in7
These assumptions have also been made by Costello and McAusland (2003). For more on the Poisson process, the reader should
consult Ross (1996, chapter 2) or Tijms (2003, chapter 1).
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Home. The right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (4) is positive because the numerator and the
denominator on the RHS are both negative. The reader will note that the expected total monetary
damage from biological invasions in a calender year is given by a particular ratio. The numerator of
this ratio is the (negative) product of the rate   of the Poisson arrival process of the monetary
damages and the parameter   of the discrete distribution function of the amounts of the consecutive
monetary damages. The denominator is the product of a simple function of the parameter   i.e.,
 and the natural logarithm of this same function. Inspection of the above expression for the
expected value tells us that as the rate   of the Poisson arrival process increases in magnitude the
expected total monetary damage from biological invasions goes up. We now compute our second
measure of the monetary damage from alien species introductions.
2.3. Second measure of damage
As in section 2.2, we wish to compute the expected total monetary damage in the interval 
which, without loss of generality, is a calender year. Once again, we assume that alien species are
introduced into Home in accordance with a Poisson process with rate   where   and 
In words, the rate of introduction of alien species into Home,   is a function of the volume of
imports   and this introduction rate is an increasing function of the volume of imports.
7 The 
introduction causes monetary damage   The   are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) and they are also assumed to be independent of the total number of alien
species introductions by time   As one might expect, the monetary damage from a specific12
introduction in the calender year   is typically not constant but variable. Therefore, we suppose
that the monetary damage from a specific alien species introduction decreases exponentially over
time. Mathematically, this means that if the initial damage from a particular species introduction is 
then at some later time   the damage is   where   is the parameter or the rate of the
exponential distribution. 
With the above description in place we can now tell that the total monetary damage from
invasive species introductions into Home in a calender year is 
(5)
where   is the arrival time of the   introduction. Obviously,   is a random variable. Therefore,
let us now compute   the expected dollar damage from alien species introductions into Home
in a calender year. Conditioning on   the total number of introductions by time   we get
(6)
Theorem 2.3.1 in Ross (1996, p. 67) tells us that conditioned on   the unordered arrival times 
are distributed as independent, uniform random variables in the interval   From this, we deduce
that given   has the same distribution as   where the   are
independent and uniformly distributed random variables in   Putting these last two pieces of
information together, we get
(7)13
where   is the initial monetary damage caused by a particular introduction and   is a uniformly
distributed random variable in   To compute the last expectation on the RHS of equation (7),
observe that
(8)
Using equation (8), we can now write
(9)
Finally, taking expectations and using the fact that   we obtain
(10)
Equation (10) gives us our second measure for the expected monetary damage in Home from the
stochastic introduction of invasive species in the interval   that is a calender year. 
This expected monetary damage depends on the mean initial monetary damage from an
introduction   on the rate   of the exponential distribution, and most importantly for our
purpose, on the rate   at which alien species are being introduced into Home. Recall that because 
the expected monetary damage metric given by equation (10) also depends on the volume of imports 
coming into Home. We now proceed to compute our third and final measure of the damage from alien
species introductions. This metric is a physical measure of damage. 
2.4. Third measure of damage8
See Costello and McAusland (2003), Batabyal and Nijkamp (2005), and Batabyal and Lee (2006) for additional details on this point.
9
See Ross (1996, p. 18) and Tijms (2003, pp. 441-442) for more on the gamma distribution. We are using the gamma distribution to
characterize the rate   because of four reasons. First, this distribution has been used previously in the natural resource economics
literature—see Batabyal and Nijkamp (in press)—to study stochastic arrival processes. Second, the gamma distribution is a general
two parameter distribution for positive random variables. Third, many other probability distribution functions are variants of the
gamma distribution. Finally, in Bayesian inference, the conjugate prior of the unknown rate parameter   is commonly modeled with
the gamma distribution. 
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Upon arrival in Home, ships unload their containers carrying cargo. The arrival of these
containers—and the possible discharge of ballast water—coincides with the arrival of a whole host
of potentially deleterious alien animal and plant species. Consistent with the approach adopted in
sections 2.2 and 2.3, we suppose that the arrival process of these alien species can be described with
a Poisson process with rate 
8 What’s different in our construction of this third measure of damage
is that unlike most of the previous literature on this subject, we suppose that this rate   of the Poisson
arrival process is a random variable that follows a gamma distribution with shape parameter   and
scale parameter 
9 As in sections 2.2 and 2.3, we assume that the time interval of interest   is
a calender year. The task before us now is to compute the total number of biological invasions in this
calender year.
Let   denote the probability that there are   biological invasions in a year. Then, using the
law of conditional probabilities and the fact that the rate   of the alien species arrival process is
gamma distributed with parameters   we reason that
(11)15
where   is the gamma function. 
Now, we know that the gamma density function   integrates to unity over
the interval   for any   Therefore, after several steps of algebra, we see that
(12)
Consulting Ross (1996, p. 16), it is clear that equation (12) describes the probability mass function
of a negative binomial random variable with parameters   and   Therefore, the total number
of biological invasions in a calender year has a negative binomial distribution with parameters   and
Using standard formulae for the negative binomial distribution, it is straightforward to
confirm that the expected number of biological invasions in a calender year or   is
(13)
Equation (13) gives us our third and final measure of damage from stochastic alien species
introductions in Home. Specifically, this equation tells us that the expected number of biological
invasions in a calender year is given by the ratio of the shape parameter   of the gamma distribution
to the scale parameter   of this same distribution. As   increases in magnitude the expected number
of biological invasions goes up and as   increases in magnitude, the expected number of biological
invasions goes down. We now move on to analyze the effects of small and optimal tariffs imposed
by Home on the expected damage from invasive species, on prices, on exports and imports, and on
social welfare in Home for four alternate market structures. 
3. Tariffs and Alien Species Management10
In the rest of this paper we shall adopt the convention of denoting the relevant Foreign functions and variables with the * superscript.
11
Results for an ad valorem tariff can be expected to be qualitatively similar to that for a specific tariff.
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3.1. Tariffs and social welfare in Home
Our two country model is adapted from the standard two country trade model discussed in
Feenstra (2004, chapter 7). Home imports a single (agricultural or manufactured) good from Foreign.
The price of the import good in Home is   and its world price is 
10 To keep the subsequent
analysis straightforward and to avoid focusing on too many cases, we shall analyze the effects of a
Home instituted specific import tariff 
11 Given   it is clear that   In addition to the import
good, we suppose that the second (numeraire) good is also traded at the fixed world price of unity.
Labor   is the only factor of production and we suppose that each unit of the numeraire good
requires one unit of labor. Therefore, wages in Home are also unity and hence total labor income in
Home equals the fixed supply of labor   The reader will note that we are in a partial equilibrium
setting in which wages are fixed and trade is balanced through flows of the numeraire good.
The output of the good in question in Home is   and the industry cost of producing this good
is   where   and   Imports are denoted by the scalar   where   is the
demand function for the good whose output is   and we suppose that   The tariff revenue 
is returned to the citizens of Home and these citizens also obtain the profits of the import competing
industry   Given this specification, we can now write the social welfare function in Home
at time   as
(14)12
For additional details on this point see Feenstra (2004, pp. 213-214).
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We see that social welfare in Home depends on prices   income  , and the
expected total damage (see equations (4), (10), and (13)) from the probabilistic introduction of alien
species   The social welfare function described by equation (14) is like an indirect
utility function for Home as a whole with one caveat and that caveat is this:
12 Home’s welfare at time 
also depends negatively on the expected damage from the introduction of alien species.
We are now in a position to analyze the impact of the specific tariff on prices, quantities,
mean damage, and social welfare under alternate market structures. To this end, let us first derive a
general expression for the change in social welfare when a tariff is put in place by Home. The
derivation of this general expression will be helped by first noting that
(15)
Continuing with the derivation, we assume that   and   both depend on the tariff   Totally




and we have used the fact that   Now note that   and because   we18
have   Using these two pieces of information, we can simplify equation (16).
This simplification yields
(18)
Let us examine the three terms on the RHS of equation (18) in greater detail. The first term
can be thought of as the efficiency effect of the tariff. The second term is the effect of the tariff on
the foreign price   or the terms of trade effect. Finally, the third term is the price-cost margin
multiplied by the change in the industry output. In the remainder of this paper, we shall use equation
(18) repeatedly to study the effects of the specific tariff   under alternate market structures. We
begin with the case in which perfect competition prevails in both Home and Foreign and Home is a
small country.
3.2. Perfect competition with Home a small country
When the home economy is perfectly competitive and it is a small country, we have 
and because   is fixed, we also have   and   We now simplify equation (18) using
these three results. This gives us
(19)
and the   in equation (19) are given in equation (17). Now recall from the discussion in section 3.1
that the expected damage from alien species introductions affects social welfare in Home negatively
and hence   We have already noted in section 2 that increasing the volume of imports19
increases the rate of introductions and therefore   Finally,   Because
the demand function slopes downward and the cost function is strictly convex, we have   and 
and hence   We now use these three results and evaluate equation (19) at   This gives
us 
(20)
Equation (20) tells us that when the expected damage in Home from stochastic alien species
introductions is monetary, i.e., when equations (4) and (10) are relevant, starting from a position of
free trade   a small tariff unambiguously raises social welfare in Home. In contrast, when the
expected damage from stochastic alien species introductions is physical, i.e., when equation (13) is
pertinent, starting from a position of free trade, a small tariff does not raise welfare. This last result
arises because the expected total physical damage—see equations (13), (15), and (17)—is
independent of the rate   of the Poisson arrival process. Put differently, the small tariff has no impact
on the expected total damage from alien species introductions and hence this tariff also has no impact
on social welfare in Home. Given these results, we now determine the impact of an optimal tariff on
social welfare in Home. To compute the optimal tariff, we set the RHS of equation (19) equal to zero
and then simplify. This gives us
(21)
Equations (20) and (21) together tell us that when social welfare depends on the expected13
Using a different model, Costello and McAusland (2003) have obtained a similar result.
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damage from the introduction of alien species, small and optimal tariffs both raise welfare in Home
as long as the expected total damage in Home is monetary, i.e., when equations (4) and (10) are
relevant. In contrast, when the expected total damage is physical and independent of the rate   a
tariff is incapable of affecting social welfare in Home and hence, in this last case, it is optimal to not
use a tariff to regulate alien species in Home. Even though Home is a small country, we have seen
that in two out of the three cases that we’re studying, tariffs have a positive impact on social welfare
and hence Home ought to have an activist trade policy in place in these two cases. 
Stepping away from the criterion of social welfare for a moment, does a small tariff lower the
expected total damage from the introduction of alien species? To answer this question, let us inspect
equation (15) carefully. This inspection tells us that   In this
paper, imports are the only means by which alien species are introduced into Home. As a result,
because a small tariff reduces the volume of imports when the expected total damage is monetary,
i.e.,   this same tariff also lowers the expected monetary damage in Home from the
introduction of alien species.
13 In contrast, when the expected total damage is physical and
independent of the rate   a small tariff has no impact on the expected total damage. This is what the
derivative   in equation (15) is telling us.
It is well known in international trade theory—see Feenstra (2004, p. 216)—that the optimal
tariff for a small country is zero. However, our analysis thus far tells us that this result does not hold
in some cases in which imports and invasive species go together. In fact, as we have just seen, when
imports are the only means by which alien species are introduced into Home and the expected total21
damage from alien species is given by either equation (4) or equation (10), the optimal course of
action for Home is to set a positive tariff. We now investigate the effects of a tariff when Home is a
large country.
3.3. Perfect competition with Home a large country
We now write the world price of imports as   Therefore, because 
and   However, because the Home economy is perfectly competitive, we still have 
Using these three results to simplify equation (18), we get
(22)
Now, because Home is a large country,   and we expect that the foreign exporter will absorb
a part of the Home tariff. As noted in Feenstra (2004, pp. 218-219), this means that in general, we
expect   and   Let us now use these two findings and the results stated in section
3.2 to evaluate equation (22) at   This gives us
(23)
Equation (23) tells us two things of note. First, as in section 3.2, we see that when the expected total
damage from alien species is monetary (equations (4) and (10) apply), starting from a position of free
trade, a small tariff, once again, raises social welfare in Home. Second, and unlike what we saw in
section 3.2, when the expected total damage from alien species is physical and independent of   the
small tariff now is not zero but positive. This is because even though the small tariff is unable to14
See Feenstra (2004, p. 220) for more details on this point.
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affect the expected total damage from alien species, because Home is a large country, the small tariff
is able to generate a beneficial terms of trade effect and hence—as shown by the   term
in equation (23)—this tariff is positive. 
To compute the optimal tariff for Home, we set the RHS of equation (22) equal to zero and
then simplify the resulting expression. This gives us
(24)
Equation (24) tells us that for the case of monetary expected total damage from alien species, i.e., for 
Home’s optimal tariff is positive and is the sum of the terms of trade effect and the damage from alien
species effect. In contrast, for the physical damage or the   case, there is no damage from alien
species effect to contend with because   but, unlike the case studied in section 3.2, there is still
a beneficial terms of trade effect. This is why the optimal tariff in this   case is also positive. The
reader will note that the optimal tariff in this   case is equivalent to the optimal import tariff for
a large country in the absence of damage from alien species.
14 Equation (24) also tells us that when
the damage from invasive species introductions is an issue, i.e., when   the optimal tariff is not
only positive but also larger in magnitude than the optimal tariff with no invasive species damage.
The impact of a small tariff on the expected total damage from alien species introductions into23
Home is, once again, given by equation (15). Although   now, as discussed earlier, in general,
we expect   to hold. Therefore, inspection of equation (15) and some thought together tell us
that   Since a small tariff reduces the volume of imports
when the expected total damage is monetary, i.e.,   this same tariff also reduces the expected
monetary damage in Home from the introduction of alien species. In contrast, when the expected total
damage is physical and independent of   a small tariff has no impact on the expected total damage
and therefore   Let us now analyze the effects of tariffs when the exporter in Foreign
is a monopolist and there are no import competing firms in Home. 
3.4. Monopolist in Foreign
In this case we have a single exporter in Foreign and we suppose that there are no import
competing firms in Home. The purpose of a tariff is generally to protect domestic firms in Home. So,
if there are no domestic firms then, in principle, there is no rationale for an import tariff. However,
as we shall see, in our case it is the damage from alien species introductions that provides a rationale
for protectionism. 
Let us denote the Foreign firm’s exports to Home by   this equals Home consumption and
therefore we can write   Inverting this expression, we get the inverse demand function 
where   Denote the price received by the Foreign exporter by   and let   denote
this firm’s cost function. We suppose that   and that   The Foreign exporter’s profit
function is   Maximizing this function with respect to the volume
of exports   gives us24
(25)
where   is the marginal revenue and   is the tariff inclusive marginal cost. Now,




Equation (26) tells us that the Foreign firm’s exports decline as a result of the tariff and equation (27)
tells us that the domestic price of the good in question inclusive of the tariff rises.
When   (as in section 3.2), the so called “pass-through” of the tariff is complete. In
other words, the tariff inclusive price   rises by the same amount as the tariff   However, when
Home is not a small country, the “pass-through” of the tariff will typically be incomplete. When this
is the case, we will have   This also means that the foreign firm will absorb a part of the
tariff. Mathematically, this means that   It should be clear to the reader that when the pass-
through of a tariff is incomplete, there is a terms of trade gain for Home.
We would now like to derive a condition which tells us when there will be a terms of trade
gain for Home. Equation (27) helps provide us with the answer. Because the numerator and the
denominator on the RHS of equation (27) are both negative, we conclude that   if and only
if25
(28)
Now, following the discussion in Feenstra (2004, pp. 221-222), we can say that the LHS of the
inequality in (28) is the slope of the inverse demand function and the RHS of this inequality is the
difference between the slopes of the marginal revenue and the marginal cost functions. To proceed
further with the derivation, it will be helpful to suppose that the Foreign cost function   is linear.
Then   and the inequality in (28) reduces to
 (29)
The inequality in (29) and some thought together tell us that when the slope of the marginal revenue
function exceeds that of the inverse demand function,   and 
We now determine the impact of the tariff on social welfare in Home. Because there are no
import competing firms in Home,   and therefore   Using this result to simplify equation
(18), we get
(30)
From the discussion in the previous paragraph we know that when the marginal revenue function is
steeper than the inverse demand function,   and   Using these two results and other
results from our earlier analysis, let us evaluate equation (30) at   We get
(31)
We see that when the expected total damage from alien species is monetary, i.e., when equations (4)26
and (10) apply and   starting from a position of free trade, a small tariff raises social welfare
in Home. In addition, when the expected damage from alien species is physical and independent of
the rate   i.e., when   as in section 3.3, a beneficial terms of trade effect results from the small
tariff and this explains why this tariff is—as shown by the last derivative in equation (31)—positive.
Does the optimal tariff also raise welfare? To answer this question, we set the RHS of
equation (30) equal to zero and then simplify the resulting expression. This gives us
(32)
The optimal import tariff when the exporter in Foreign is a monopolist, when there are no import
competing firms in Home, and when the expected total damage from alien species is physical and
independent of the rate   is given by the second expression in (32). This expression is the ratio of
two negative quantities and hence the optimal tariff described by this expression is positive. Equation
(32) tells us that when the damage from invasive species introductions is monetary, we have
 and in these two instances, the optimal tariff—given by the first expression in (32)—is
not only positive but also larger in magnitude than the optimal tariff with physical alien species
damage. 
As in sections 3.2 and 3.3, equation (15) gives us the impact of a small tariff on the expected
total damage from alien species introductions into Home. Equation (27) tells us that   Using
this and our previous results in equations (15) and (17) tell us that27
 Since a small tariff reduces the volume of imports when
the expected total damage is monetary, i.e.,   this same tariff also reduces the expected
monetary damage in Home from the introduction of alien species. In contrast, when the expected total
damage is physical and independent of   a small tariff has no impact on the expected total damage
and hence   We now study the impacts of a tariff when the Foreign exporter and an
import competing firm in Home engage in Cournot competition. 
3.5. Cournot competition
We now have a Home (domestic) firm competing with an exporting firm from Foreign in the
domestic market. Let us denote the sales of the Foreign exporting firm by   and that of the Home
import competing firm by   so that aggregate consumption of the good in question at Home is
 Following the logic of section 3.4, the pertinent demand function now is   and
therefore the relevant inverse demand function is   where   
Using the notation of section 3.4, the profit functions of the Foreign exporter and the Home
import competing firm are   and   Maximizing these two




The reader can confirm that the two second order conditions for profit maximization are15
We assume that the stability condition   is satisfied.
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 and 
15 We now want to determine
the impact of the Home tariff on the Foreign firm’s exports. In other words, we want to determine
the sign of the derivative   To determine this sign, we totally differentiate equation (33) and
then use the second order condition for   given above. This gives us
(35)
Equation (35) tells us that with the Home tariff in place, the Foreign exporter reduces the amount it
wishes to export to Home.
To study the impact of the Home tariff on prices, it will be necessary to first compute the
impact of the tariff on total sales   To do this, let us now sum the two first order necessary
conditions given in equations (33) and (34). This gives
(36)
Totally differentiating equation (36) and then simplifying, we get
(37)
Now, as in section 3.4, to progress further it will help to make a simplifying assumption. Therefore,
we assume that the cost functions of the two competing firms in Home and in Foreign are both linear.
Then equation (37) can be simplified to give us
(38)29
and, because   we have
(39)
Inspecting the denominators on the RHSs of equations (38) and (39) we see that the impact of the
Home tariff on total output   and the price   depends significantly on the sign of 
When this expression is negative, we have   and   In words, total output with the
tariff declines, and the price in Home with the tariff rises. Some thought will convince the reader that
the condition   holds for some inverse demand functions (such as the linear function)
but not for all such functions. This tells us that the imposition of a tariff by Home may lead to
counterintuitive results. Specifically, total output with the tariff may rise   and the domestic
price of the good in question at Home may fall 
We now focus on the “pass-through” of the tariff   We know that for there to be a terms of
trade gain in Home, we must have   Now, when   holds, from equation
(39) we can tell that for   to hold, we must have 
(40)
The expression   on the RHS of (40) is the slope of the marginal revenue function
 Therefore, what (40) is really saying is that when the marginal revenue function is
downward sloping   holds or, alternately,   and hence there is a terms of trade gain
for Home. 
We now ascertain the impact of the tariff on social welfare in Home. Because   in16
See Feenstra (2004, pp. 225-226) for a graphical explanation of this line of reasoning.
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equilibrium, we use this to rewrite equation (18) as 
(41)
From equation (35) we know that   Further, as we have just discussed in the previous
paragraph, when the inequality in (40) holds, the marginal revenue function is downward sloping and
hence   Finally, because   in general, we expect 
16 Using
these three results we can evaluate equation (41) at   This gives us
 
(42)
Consider the cases in which the expected total damage from alien species introductions is monetary.
These are the   cases. In these two cases, equation (42) tells us that when the inequality in (40)
holds, a small tariff leads to a terms of trade gain   In addition, when   there is an
additional gain from this small tariff. These two positive effects along with the fact that the first term
on the RHS of equation (42) with   in it is positive together tell us that a small tariff raises social
welfare in Home. Next, consider the   case in which the expected total damage from alien species31
introductions is physical and independent of   In this case   but we still have a beneficial terms
of trade effect and a general increase in domestic output as a result of the small tariff. These two
positive effects explain why the small tariff in this   case is also positive. The reader should note
that in this case of Cournot competition, it is not inevitable that a small tariff will lead to an increase
in domestic output. It is certainly possible that   and when this happens, this negative effect
will tend to offset the positive terms of trade effect and hence the impact of a small tariff on social
welfare in Home may not be positive.
Does the optimal import tariff raise social welfare in Home? To answer this question, we set
the RHS of equation (41) equal to zero and then simplify the resulting expression. This gives us
(43)
Assuming that the inequality in (40) holds, let us first focus on the   cases. There are three terms
on the RHS of equation (43) to discuss. The first term is positive because both   and   are
negative. The second term is positive because the numerator is generally positive and the
denominator is negative. Finally, the third term is positive because   
and   Therefore, the optimal tariff which is the sum of three positive terms is itself positive.
Next, focus on the   case. In this case, the expected total damage from alien species introductions
is independent of the rate   and hence this case is like the case in which there is Cournot competition17
See Brander and Spencer (1984), Horstmann and Markusen (1986), and Helpman and Krugman (1989) for more on this literature.
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between the exporting and the import competing firms and there is no damage from invasive species
introductions. In this case, Home’s optimal tariff is positive and it is the sum of the first two terms
as shown in the last derivative in equation (43). Finally, equation (43) tells us that the optimal tariff
in the   cases is the sum of three positive terms and hence larger in magnitude than the optimal
tariff in the   case.
As in sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, equation (15) gives us the impact of a small tariff on the
expected total damage from alien species introductions into Home. Using equation (35), the fact that 
in equilibrium, and our previous analysis, we reason that 
Since a small tariff diminishes the volume of exports when the expected total damage from alien
species is monetary, i.e.,   this same tariff also reduces the expected monetary damage in
Home from the introduction of alien species. In contrast, when the expected total damage is physical
and independent of   a small tariff has no impact on the expected total damage and hence
 These results about the impact of the tariff on the expected total monetary damage
from invasive species in sections 3.2 to 3.5 are similar to and consistent with Proposition 1 in
Costello and McAusland (2003, p. 967).
In the strategic trade theory literature of the 1980s, a considerable amount of emphasis was
placed on the third term   in equation (41) and this third term was often thought of
as a profit shifting rationale for the strategic use of tariffs.
17 While this interpretation makes sense
when the derivative   is positive, we have already pointed out that this need not always be the33
case. Suppose for the moment that   is positive. Then, what we have seen thus far in this paper
is that in addition to any profit shifting rationale, in the presence of monetary damage from alien
species introductions, there is a second and arguably more important rationale for the use of import
tariffs. Indeed, when tariffs are used as described in this paper, it may be possible to “kill three birds
with one stone.” What we mean by this expression is that the Home government may be able to (i)
obtain a terms of trade benefit, (ii) shift profits away from the Foreign exporter and toward the
domestic import competing firm, and (iii) reduce the monetary damage from deleterious alien species.
We now discuss the form of the dependence of all the tariff expressions in this paper on the expected
total damage from alien species introductions in Home. Then, we briefly talk about scenarios in
which this form of dependence would be different.
3.6. Form of dependence of tariffs on damage from alien species introductions
We derived three measures of damage from alien species introductions in sections 2.2 through
2.4 of this paper. Of these three measures, the first two measures—equations (4) and (10)—are
monetary and the third measure—equation (13)—is physical. In our detailed analysis thus far, we
have seen that tariffs are useful policies with which to control the deleterious effects of alien species
introductions when equations (4) and (10) are pertinent, i.e., when the damage measure is monetary.
This is because in these two cases, the rate   of the Poisson arrival process directly influences the
two derived damage metrics. In contrast, tariffs have no role to play as an alien species control device
when equation (13) is germane because in this case, the derived damage metric is independent of 
We now note two features of our analysis thus far. First, even though equations (4) and (10)
are dissimilar damage measures, in both these equations, the rate   enters the damage measure
multiplicatively. Second, the three expected damage measures of this paper enter the social welfare34
function in Home—see equation (14)—in a standard manner. In other words, we have
 Therefore, when we differentiate this social welfare function
with respect to the tariff   we get the multiplicative term   It is these
two modeling features that together account for the fact that the   term affects all our tariff
expressions—see equations (20), (21), (23), (24), (31), (32), (42) and (43)—multiplicatively. 
We stress that the positivity of most of the tariffs that we have analyzed in this paper is not
the result of modeling the damage from alien species introductions in a particular way. In fact, as we
have shown in this paper, even for dissimilar damage measures, this positivity result largely holds.
We conclude this section by pointing out that if the two modeling features delineated in the previous
paragraph do not hold then it is possible that the signs of some of the small and the optimal tariffs in
the four different market structures that we have analyzed will become ambiguous.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a theoretical perspective on the impacts of small and optimal
specific tariffs when international trade in goods results in the stochastic introductions of alien
species from one country to another as a byproduct. Conducting the analysis from the standpoint of
the tariff imposing country, i.e., Home, we first derived three—two monetary and one
physical—measures of the expected total damage from alien species introductions into Home. Next,
we analyzed the effects of small and optimal tariffs under four alternate market structures. Our basic
result is that there are several circumstances in which it makes sense to use trade policy (tariffs) to
control the damage from alien plant and/or animal species. 
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In what follows, we35
suggest two possible extensions of this paper’s research. First, in our model the rate of alien species
introductions depends only on the volume of imports. Therefore, it would be useful to determine the
extent to which one can obtain results from a model in which in addition to the volume of imports,
the rate of species introductions depends also on the number of previously successful introductions.
Second, it would be useful to analyze the impacts of import quotas to see if our basic result from the
previous paragraph also holds in the case of quotas. Studies of alien species management that
incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis will provide additional insights into a
management problem that has considerable economic and ecological implications.36
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